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Background: The increased use and adoption of Electronic Health Records (EHR) causes a tremendous growth in
digital information useful for clinicians, researchers and many other operational purposes. However, this information
is rich in Protected Health Information (PHI), which severely restricts its access and possible uses. A number of
investigators have developed methods for automatically de-identifying EHR documents by removing PHI, as
specified in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act “Safe Harbor” method.
This study focuses on the evaluation of existing automated text de-identification methods and tools, as applied to
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) clinical documents, to assess which methods perform better with each
category of PHI found in our clinical notes; and when new methods are needed to improve performance.
Methods: We installed and evaluated five text de-identification systems “out-of-the-box” using a corpus of VHA
clinical documents. The systems based on machine learning methods were trained with the 2006 i2b2 de-
identification corpora and evaluated with our VHA corpus, and also evaluated with a ten-fold cross-validation
experiment using our VHA corpus. We counted exact, partial, and fully contained matches with reference
annotations, considering each PHI type separately, or only one unique ‘PHI’ category. Performance of the systems
was assessed using recall (equivalent to sensitivity) and precision (equivalent to positive predictive value) metrics, as
well as the F2-measure.
Results: Overall, systems based on rules and pattern matching achieved better recall, and precision was always
better with systems based on machine learning approaches. The highest “out-of-the-box” F2-measure was 67% for
partial matches; the best precision and recall were 95% and 78%, respectively. Finally, the ten-fold cross validation
experiment allowed for an increase of the F2-measure to 79% with partial matches.
Conclusions: The “out-of-the-box” evaluation of text de-identification systems provided us with compelling insight
about the best methods for de-identification of VHA clinical documents. The errors analysis demonstrated an
important need for customization to PHI formats specific to VHA documents. This study informed the planning and
development of a “best-of-breed” automatic de-identification application for VHA clinical text.
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With the increased use and adoption of Electronic Health
Records (EHR) systems, we have witnessed a tremendous
growth in digital information useful for clinicians, research-
ers and many other operational purposes. However, this
vastness of data is rich in Protected Health Information
(PHI), which severely restricts its access and possible uses.
In the United States, the confidentiality of patient data
is protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA; codified as 45 CFR }160 and
164) and the Common Rule [1]. These laws typically re-
quire the informed consent of the patient and approval
of the Internal Review Board (IRB) to use data for re-
search purposes, but these requirements are sometimes
extremely difficult or even impossible to fulfill (e.g.,
retrospective studies of large patient populations who
moved, changed healthcare system, or died). Such
requirements can be waived if data is de-identified. For
clinical data to be considered de-identified, the HIPAA
“Safe Harbor” technique requires 18 PHI identifiers to
be removed; further details regarding these 18 PHI iden-
tifiers can be found in [2,3].
As EHRs are growing exponentially and a significant
amount of clinical information is stored as unstructured
data, manual de-identification becomes prohibitively
time consuming; the construction of automated systems
capable of de-identifying clinical documents could allevi-
ate this issue and is nowadays an important challenge
for the research community.
Optimal strategies to automatically de-identify clinical
documents would also facilitate the availability of clinical
narratives for clinical information extraction applications
development, and applications that are able to produce
structured information from clinical narratives are of
paramount importance for clinical research [4]. Al-
though the potential uses of information extraction from
clinical text are numerous and far-reaching, most appli-
cations are rarely applied outside of the laboratories they
have been developed in, mostly because of scalability
and generalizability issues, which could be surpassed if
large sets of de-identified narratives were made available.
This represents a strong motivation to develop auto-
mated de-identification systems and encourages us to
find the best methods to de-identify our documents.
When text de-identification could not be accom-
plished, researchers could rely on alternative methods
such as HIPAA-compliant computational protected
environments, or release of derived data that do not
contain PHI (e.g., aggregate data statistics). However, in
this case researchers outside the institution could not
take advantage of the rich information hidden within the
textual content of the clinical documents.
Text de-identification involves challenges related to
the extraction of precise pieces of information fromunstructured data, and resembles the traditional Named
Entity Recognition (NER) [5] task often addressed with
Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms and
methods. As stated in [3], most automated de-
identification systems target only some types of PHI, and
not all 18 classes of PHI cited in HIPAA. Furthermore,
the majority of systems used only one or two specific
document types, making the generalization of these
methods across varied document sources difficult.
We will now briefly describe the main approaches fol-
lowed to tackle the de-identification problem.
Principal methods used for automatic de-identification
Although many systems combine different approaches
to de-identify specific PHI types, we present here a
broad classification depending on the main technique
used to obscure PHI. Specifically, we classify de-
identification tools in two groups of methodologies:
rule-based and machine learning-based, as proposed in
an earlier publication [3].
Rule-based systems usually tackle the de-identification
task with pattern matching, regular expressions and dic-
tionary lookups [6-9]. The major drawback of this ap-
proach is the need for experienced domain experts to
manually create patterns, rules and dictionaries. This im-
plies a tedious task with limited generalizability. Al-
though some dictionaries are quite generalizable such as
lists of first names and countries, others are built specif-
ically for the institution in which the system was devel-
oped in (e.g., list of actual names of patients, physicians
or healthcare providers). In addition, the developers of
rule-based systems have to be aware of all possible PHI
patterns that can occur, such as unexpected date formats
or non-standard abbreviations. Rule-based methods re-
quire little or no annotated training data, and can be
easily and quickly modified to improve performance by
adding rules, dictionary terms, or regular expressions.
Machine learning-based systems
Recent applications tend to mostly base their predictions
on supervised machine learning methods. Although such
methods require a large annotated corpus for training, a
resource that requires significant work in terms of
human resources, supervised machine learning methods
have the advantage of automatically learning how to
recognize complex PHI patterns; consequently, develo-
pers require little knowledge of PHI patterns. One disad-
vantage of machine learning-based systems is that they
may not learn PHI patterns that occur rarely in the
annotated corpus. For machine learning algorithms, fea-
ture selection is the key aspect of these systems. Most of
them use a variety of features ranging from lexical fea-
tures (e.g., word-level features such as word case, punc-
tuation, special and numerical characters, and the
Ferrández et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2012, 12:109 Page 3 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109morphology of the word) to contextual features or com-
plex features derived, for instance, from part-of-speech
tagging or lexical-semantic resources [10-16].
Therefore, although machine learning de-identification
methods are typically more generalizable than rule-based
methods, it is sometimes difficult to know precisely why
the method committed an error and additional training
data is often required when these approaches are applied
to a new dataset.
The scope of this research is under the umbrella of an
informatics initiative funded by the Department of
Veteran’s Affairs, called the Consortium for Healthcare
Informatics Research (CHIR); focusing on utilizing both
structured and unstructured data previously unavailable
for research and operational purposes. These efforts
have also focused on creating a high-performance com-
puting environment to support data management, analy-
tics and development environments called the Veterans’
Informatics, Information and Computing Infrastructure
(VINCI). Therefore, building tools that can be used to
automatically de-identify Veteran’s Health Administra-
tion (VHA) clinical documents is of paramount import-
ance in the development of this initiative.
To be trusted, automatic de-identification has to provide
“acceptable” accuracy, but what this acceptable perform-
ance should be remains a controversial question. No
accepted objective answer to this question exists, and
many factors influence this answer: the final purpose of
the de-identified documents, the legal agreements that
could be imposed to avoid re-identification, and the fact
that some PHI categories are more sensitive than others.
We also believe that since patient confidentiality is critical,
de-identification systems should give more emphasis to
sensitivity than to positive predictive value. With this con-
sideration in mind, and to guide our efforts, we set this
“acceptable” performance to a sensitivity of 95% and a
positive predictive value of 80% for highly sensitive PHI
(patient names and SSN), and a sensitivity of 85% and
positive predictive value of 70% for other types of PHI.
Throughout this paper, we will present an evaluation
of existing automated text de-identification methods
and tools applied to VHA clinical documents. The
main research question guiding this evaluation is: Can
existing text de-identification applications have suffi-
cient accuracy (recall ≥ 90% and precision ≥ 80%) when
used “out-of-the-box” with VHA clinical text? Two
follow-up questions asked in this study are: 1) What
improvement in accuracy does the re-training with the
VHA corpus allow when tested with VHA clinical
text?; and 2) Which methods and resources allow for
the best accuracy for each PHI category? This study
will eventually provide useful knowledge to and inform
development of a de-identification system customized
for VHA clinical documents.Methods
We selected five clinical text de-identification tools and
evaluated them to assess the performance of current text
de-identification methods with VHA clinical documents.
After reviewing the literature [3], we chose successful
automated clinical documents de-identification systems
and selected systems that tackled the de-identification
task from different perspectives and approaches in order
to have a global picture of the different methods used.
The focus of this study is to identify the most success-
ful methods for de-identifying VHA clinical documents,
and although we report evaluation results for all systems
tested in this study, it is not our goal to make a compari-
son or competition between them.
Main characteristics of selected rule-based
de-identification systems
 HMS Scrubber [6]. HMS Scrubber is a freely
available open source tool developed within the
Shared Pathology Informatics Network (SPIN). It
was designed to obscure HIPAA identifiers and
tailored to pathology reports. As part of the SPIN
project, an XML schema was defined to
accommodate different information contained
within a pathology report; HMS Scrubber can
operate with such an XML schema as well as plain-
text documents. The algorithmic structure of HMS
Scrubber involves the following steps: (1) if the
reports follow the SPIN XML schema, HMS
Scrubber takes advantage of the predefined
information and searches for any occurrences of
these identifiers in the textual portion of the
document; (2) pattern matching with regular
expressions, 50 regular expressions are used to
detect potential PHI such as dates, phone and social
security numbers; and (3) word-based dictionary
lookups, comparing each word in the document to a
database of over 101,000 unique personal and
geographic place names built from the U.S. 1990
Census [17].
 The Medical De-identification System (MeDS) [7].
MeDS was developed and tested on different types
of free-text clinical records such as discharge
summaries, clinical notes, and laboratory and
pathology reports. This system was especially tuned
to process Health Level Seven (HL7) messages [18],
but it can easily be modified to accept other
document formats. MeDS de-identifies documents
through several steps: (1) pre-processing of the well-
labeled patient identifiers in report headers (when
applicable), and using this information to find the
same identifiers in the narrative parts of the report;
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addresses, state names and abbreviations, time, ages,
e-mail addresses, etc.; (3) name matching with two
lists: a list of proper names extracted from different
sources (see Table 1 for details) and a list of
common usage words. Additionally, it searches for
predictive markers such as ‘Mr.’ or ‘Dr.’ and uses
part-of-speech information to assist with
disambiguation of proper names. And, (4) MeDS
uses name nearness matching based on a text string
nearness algorithm to deal with typographical errors
and variants of the patient’s known first, middle and
last names.
 The MIT deid software package [9]. This software,
freely available at the PhysioNet website, was
designed to be applicable to a variety of free-text
medical records, removing both HIPAA identifiers
and an extended PHI set that includes years of
dates. The de-identification procedure performs
lexical matching with lookup tables, regularble 1 Main characteristics of the de-identification tools
HMS Scru
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de-identification systems
 The MITRE Identification Scrubber Toolkit (MIST)
[10]. MIST provides an environment to support
rapid tailoring of automated de-identification to
different types of documents. It allows end users to
annotate training data and run subsequent
experiments. To detect PHI identifiers, MIST uses a
machine learning classifier (Conditional Random
Fields). and tackles de-identification as a sequence-
labeling problem assigning labels to individual
words, indicating whether the word is part of a
specific type of PHI, or whether it does not belong
to the PHI phrase. A well-known encoding using
this labeling is the BIO schema; Figure 1 depicts an
example of BIO annotations. In the figure, BT
indicates that the word is the beginning of a PHI
phrase of type T, IT indicates a word inside or at the
end of a PHI phrase of type T and O indicates a
word outside a PHI phrase. MIST uses the BIO
schema, and is structured to allow the addition of
new learning features for the CRF predictions. The
default feature specification distributed with MIST
only includes a few features; such as the target word,
prefixes and suffixes from length 1 to 3,
capitalization of the target word and the following
word, digits inside the target word, context words
denoting a company in the next four words (e.g.,
“Ltd.”, “Corp.”, “Co.”, “Inc.”), a context window of 3
words, and 2- and 3-grams of words surrounding
the target word.
 The Health Information DE-identification (HIDE)
system [12]. HIDE also provides an environment for
tagging, classifying and retagging, which allows the
construction of large training datasets without
intensive human intervention. For de-identifying
documents, HIDE also uses a CRF model for
predicting PHI and deals with the problem by
tagging each token using the aforementioned BIO
schema. The main difference with MIST is that
HIDE provides a larger set of features by default.
Approximately, 34 features are derived from the
morphology of the token (e.g., capitalization, special
characters, affixes from length 1 to 3, single- double-Figure 1 Example of BIO annotations.triple- and quadruple-digit word, and digits inside,
to name but a few); moreover, the context-window
processed by HIDE comprises the four previous and
four following tokens.
Table 1 illustrates a comprehensive summary of the
main characteristics of these systems, allowing the
reader to have an easy comparison of the systems’ simi-
larities and differences. This information was obtained
from the systems’ documentation, as well as from the
analysis of their source code files.
Evaluation methodology
In order to assess the performance of the selected de-
identification tools with VHA clinical documents, we
measured the capability of redacting PHI in terms of re-
call (equivalent to sensitivity here), precision (equivalent
to positive predictive value), and F-measure (harmonic
mean of recall and precision). Since recall is of para-
mount importance for de-identification (PHI cannot be
disclosed at any rate), we used the F2-measure, which
weighs recall (twice) higher than precision and is calcu-
lated as follows:
Fβ measure ¼
β2 þ 1 ⋅precision⋅recall
β2⋅precisionþ recalll ; β ¼ 2
Recall and precision were computed with counts of
true positives (system output matches the reference
standard), false positives (spurious system output), and
false negatives (missed by the system), and we carried
out different ways of comparing the system outputs with
our reference standard.Reference standard corpora
Two different reference standard corpora were used for
this study: 1) the 2006 i2b2 de-identification challenge
corpus [19], and 2) a corpus of various VHA clinical
documents developed for the CHIR de-identification
project.
The i2b2 de-identification corpus includes 889 docu-
ments (discharge summaries) that were de-identified and
all PHI “re-synthesized” (i.e., automatically replaced with
realistic surrogates; further details about the re-synthesis
strategy can be found in [19]). This corpus was anno-
tated for 8 categories of PHI and includes 19,498 PHI
annotations (details in Table 2):
 Patients: includes the first and last name of patients,
their health proxies, and family members, excluding
titles (e.g., Mrs. Smith was admitted).
 Doctors: refers to medical doctors and other
practitioners mentioned in the records, excluding
titles.
Table 2 PHI category distribution and mapping for the VHA, i2b2 and Swedish Stockholm EPR corpora
VHA corpus Instances i2b2 corpus Instances Stockholm EPR De-identified Corpus Instances
Patient Name 206 (3.88%) Patients 929 (4.76%) Person Name First Name 923 (20.87%)
Relative Name 30 (0.55%)
Other Person Name 20 (0.37%) Last Name 929 (21%)
Healthcare Provider Name 492 (9.08%) Doctors 3751 (19.24%)
Street City 137 (2.53%) Locations 263 (1.35%) Location 148 (3.35%)
State Country 161 (2.97%)
Zip code 4 (0.07%)
Deployment 43 (0.79%) - - - -
Healthcare Unit Name 1453 (26.83%) Hospitals 2400 (12.31%) Health_Care_Unit 1021 (23.08%)
Other Organization 86 (1.59%) - - - -
Date 2547 (47.03%) Dates 7098 (36.40%) Date_Part 710 (16.05%)
Full_Date 500 (11.30%)
Age> 89 4 (0.07%) Ages 16 (0.08%) Age 56 (1.27%)
Phone Number 90 (1.66%) Phone Numbers 232 (1.19%) Phone Number 136 (3.07%)
Electronic Address 4 (0.07%) - - - -
SSN 16 (0.30%) IDs 4809 (24.66%) - -
Other ID Number 123 (2.27%) - -
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nursing homes, including room numbers, buildings
and floors (e.g., Patient was transferred to room
900).
 Locations: includes geographic locations such as
cities, states, street names, zip codes, building
names, and numbers.
 Dates: includes all elements of a date. Originally,
years were not annotated in this corpus, however we
modified these annotations in order to consider
years and then be consistent with our VHA date
annotations.
 Phone numbers: includes telephone, pager, and fax
numbers.
 Ages: ages above 90 years old.
 IDs: refers to any combination of numbers, letters,
and special characters identifying medical records,
patients, doctors, or hospitals (e.g., medical record
number).
The VHA de-identification corpus includes a large var-
iety of clinical documents. A stratified random sampling
approach was used to ensure good representation of the
variety of clinical notes found at the VHA and a suffi-
cient representation of less common note types. Docu-
ments created between 04/01/2008 and 3/31/2009 and
containing more than 500 words (to ensure sufficient
textual content and PHI identifiers) were included. We
then used the 100 most frequent types of clinical notes
at the VHA as strata for sampling, and randomly
selected 8 documents in each stratum, therefore ending
with 800 documents in this corpus. Figure 2 depicts thefrequency of the 100 most frequent clinical note types
(Addendum excluded). These most frequent note types
include consult notes from different specialties, nursing
notes, discharge summaries, ER notes, progress notes,
preventive health notes, surgical pathology reports,
psychiatry notes, history and physical notes, informed
consent, operation reports, and other less common note
types. A few document types correspond to the majority
of the clinical notes available. In our case, the 10 most
frequent note types correspond to 42% of all clinical
notes, and the 25 most frequent note types to 65%.
As already mentioned, an objective of our sampling
strategy was to create a reference corpus as much repre-
sentative of the variety of VHA clinical notes as possible,
and although this strategy resulted in oversampling low
frequency notes, it also allowed us to measure the
generalizability of de-identification tools across docu-
ment types to a certain extent.
We then manually annotated the documents using a
PHI schema that included all categories of PHI defined
in the HIPAA “Safe Harbor” legislation [2], as well as
some armed forces-specific information such as deploy-
ment locations, and units. Each document was inde-
pendently annotated by two reviewers, disagreements
were adjudicated by a third reviewer, and a fourth re-
viewer eventually examined ambiguous and difficult
adjudicated cases. The PHI categories annotated in our
corpus were defined as follows:
 Names: all occurrences of person names, distributed
in four sub-categories (i.e., patients, relatives,
healthcare providers, and other persons) and
Figure 2 Frequency distribution of the 100 most frequent VHA document types.
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initials (not titles), e.g. “Patient met Dr. JAMISON
JAMES”.
 Street City: addresses including the city, street
number and name, apartment number, etc. (e.g.,
“lived on 5 Main Street, Suite 200, Albany NY
0000”).
 State Country: all mentions of states and countries.
It also includes mentions of countries associated
with military service, service awards, or place of
residence at the time of deployment (e.g., “He was
awarded the Korean service medal”).
 ZIP code: zip code information.
 Deployment: armed forces-specific identifiers that
describe a deployment location, or mention of units,
battalion, regiment, brigade, etc. (e.g., “had worked
as a cook at Air Base 42 for 3 yrs”).
 Healthcare Unit Name: any facility performing
health care services, including smaller units
(e.g., detox clinics, HIV clinics), and generic
locations such as MICU, SICU, ICU, ER. This also
includes all explicit mentions of healthcare facilities,
clinical laboratories, assisted living, nursing
homes, and generic mentions such as “the hospital”,
“the clinic”, or “medical service” (e.g., “patient
was referred to the blue clinic”, “transferred
to 4 west”).
 Other Organization Name: company or organization
names not related with healthcare that are
attributed to a patient or provider (e.g., “patient is
an active member of the Elk’s club”).
 Date: all elements of a date, including year and time,
days of the week, and day abbreviations(e.g., “on December, 11, 2009@11:45am”,
“administered every Monday, TU, and Thurs”).
 Age> 89: all instances of age greater than 89 years
old.
 Phone Number: all numeric or alphanumeric
combinations of phone, fax, or pager numbers,
including phone number extensions (e.g., “call
000-LEAD”, “dial x8900”).
 Electronic Address: references to electronic mail
addresses, web pages and IP addresses.
 SSN: combinations of numbers and characters
representing a social security number,
including first initial of last name and last
four digits of the SSN (e.g., “L0000 was seen
in clinic”).
 Other ID Number: all other combinations of
numbers and letters that could represent a
medical record number, lab test number, or other
patient or provider identifier such as driver’s
license number (e.g., “prescription number:
0234569”, “Job 13579/JSS”).
For the study presented here, a subset of 225 clinical
documents was randomly selected from the annotated
VHA de-identification corpus. The 225-document evalu-
ation corpus contained 5,416 PHI annotations. Since our
objective in this study was to measure how available text
de-identification methods perform with VHA documents,
to then develop a best-of-breed system adapted for VHA
clinical narratives, we had to perform a detailed errors
analysis. We decided to use this subset of 225 documents
for this study and set part of the corpus aside for future
independent evaluation.
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egory in our 225-document VHA corpus, along with the
corresponding categories in the i2b2 de-identification cor-
pus, as well as the Swedish Stockholm EPR De-identified
corpus [20]. Although we did not use the latter in this
study, we included it in this table to have another com-
parison of the distribution of PHI in clinical documents.
As shown in the table, Dates, Healthcare Units, and Per-
son Names are the most common PHI categories, while
other categories like Ages rarely appear in clinical docu-
ments. The PHI category distribution varies significantly
between the three different corpora. For example, Loca-
tions represent 5.57% of the annotations in the VHA cor-
pus (considering Street City, State Country and Zip code
as Locations), while this percentage drops to 1.35% in the
i2b2 corpus and 3.35% in the Swedish Stockholm EPR
De-identified corpus. These differences contribute to the
difficulties encountered when developing automated text
de-identification tools that could be applied across differ-
ent institutions and document types, a challenge that is
still unmet.
Systems implementation and testing
We carried out an “out-of-the-box” evaluation of each
text de-identification system, using their default config-
uration. Rule-based systems (HMS Scrubber, MeDS, and
MIT deid system) used the original regular expression
sets, dictionaries and de-identification algorithms imple-
mented by their developers, and were directly tested
with our 225 documents reference standard. The ma-
chine learning-based systems (MIST and HIDE) had to
be trained with annotated samples of text, and were run
with their default configuration. We opted for two differ-
ent methods to train and test these systems: 1) Using
the i2b2 de-identification challenge corpus [19] for train-
ing, and our 225-document corpus for testing. This
method used publicly available resources for training
and gave us useful information about the generalizability
of such systems to different types of corpora. 2) Using
our 225-document corpus for training and testing with a
10-fold cross-validation approach. For this method, the
225-document corpus was randomly split into 10 subsets
(or folds) without specific consideration of the documentFigure 3 Example of exact, partial and fully-contained matches.types strata. We then performed the analysis of each fold
as the testing data, using the remaining folds for train-
ing, and finally averaging the results achieved for each
fold to produce a single measurement.
Systems output analysis
Once the text de-identification tools were run on the
evaluation corpus, their output was compared with our
reference standard using exact, partial, and “fully-
contained” matches, and considering each PHI category
separately, or as one ‘PHI’ category.
The different kinds of matches were evaluated as fol-
lows (Figure 3):
i. Exact matches mean that the boundaries or
character offset of the predicted PHI have to
correspond exactly to the PHI annotation in the
reference standard to be considered a true positive.
ii. Partial matches consider as correct predictions
those with some overlap with the reference PHI
annotations. A partial match means that if the
prediction partly overlaps with the reference PHI
(even only one character), it will be tagged as true
positive. This definition of partial matches provides
us with a hypothetical performance of the systems if
we adapted its redaction techniques to entirely cover
our PHI formats.
iii. Fully-contained matches try to relax the previous
exact matching strategy but ensure all PHI is
detected. A fully-contained match therefore
considers the prediction as a true positive when it at
least overlaps with the entire PHI annotation in the
reference standard.
When evaluating system outputs with reference standard
matches, all PHI predictions made by a system can be
considered as one general PHI category, and then com-
pared with the corresponding unique PHI category in
the reference corpus, or each PHI category can be com-
pared separately:
i. Results with one unique ‘PHI’ category imply
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109annotations. Then, when processing the different
kinds of matches (i.e. exact, partial or fully-
contained) the system annotations are compared
with all PHI annotations from the reference.
ii. Results for each type of PHI separately involve
mapping the PHI categories annotated by each de-
identification tool with the different PHI categories
specified in our reference standard. To achieve this,
we created a series of mappings for each tool we
evaluated. Although most tools share many PHI
categories with our reference standard (e.g., Dates,
Phone Numbers, SSN), other tools’ annotations are
less specific, mapping to several PHI categories in
our reference standard, or sometimes more specific.
For instance, Names annotations made by HMS
Scrubber could refer to Patient, Relative, Healthcareble 3 “Out-of-the-box” overall results for using the VHA ev






























































verall results EXACT MATCHES PARTIA
MIST HIDE MIST
ne PHI P (CI) 0.54 0.50 0.95
(0.52-0.56) (0.48-0.52) (0.935-0.965
R (CI) 0.25 0.27 0.46
(0.24-0.26) (0.26-0.28) (0.445-0.475
F2 (CI) 0.28 0.30 0.51
(0.265-0.295) (0.285-0.315) (0.495-0.525
l PHI types P (CI) 0.52 0.48 0.90
(0.495-0.545) (0.46-0.50) (0.885-0.915
R (CI) 0.24 0.25 0.44
(0.225-255) (0.24-0.26) (0.425-0.455
F2 (CI) 0.27 0.28 0.49
(0.255-0.285) (0.265-0.295) (0.475-0.505
: Confidence Interval obtained with a confidence level of 95%.
e PHI = one overall PHI category considered.
l PHI types = each PHI type evaluated separately.
Precision; R=Recall; F2= F2-measure.Provider or Other Person Names, and the Accession
Code and Medical Record annotations produced by
the MIT deid system both would map to Other ID
Numbers in our reference standard.
This study has been performed with the approval of
the appropriate ethics committee, University of Utah
IRB approval reference number IRB_00031374, and the
VA Office of Research and Development (approval num-
ber 2011-06-007D).Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results achieved in the
“out-of-the-box” evaluation, grouping them into princi-
pally rule-based or machine learning-based methods. Foraluation corpus exact, partial and fully-contained
separately
ARTIAL MATCHES FULLY-CONTAINED MATCHES

































































L MATCHES FULLY-CONTAINED MATCHES
HIDE MIST HIDE
0.89 0.58 0.56
) (0.875-0.905) (0.56-0.60) (0.54-0.58)
0.49 0.28 0.30
) (0.475-0.505) (0.27-29) (0.29-31)
0.54 0.31 0.33
) (0.525-0.555) (0.295-0.325) (0.315-0.345)
0.84 0.55 0.52
) (0.825-0.855) (0.525-0.575) (0.50-0.54)
0.46 0.27 0.28
) (0.445-0.475) (0.255-0.285) (0.265-0.295)
0.50 0.30 0.31
) (0.485-0.515) (0.285-0.315) (0.295-0.325)
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109these results, MIST and HIDE were trained using the
i2b2 de-identification corpus as described previously.
Table 3 shows the overall results in terms of precision,
recall and F2-measure, with one unique PHI category,
and with all PHI types, for exact, partial and fully-
contained matches. Confidence intervals (CI) were com-
puted using a confidence level of 95%.
Table 4 presents recall (i.e., sensitivity) values for each
PHI type considering partial and fully-contained
matches. In this table, exact match results were not
reported because the systems were not designed follow-
ing our annotation guidelines and often add word deli-
miters or other characters to their annotations that don’t
correspond to the exact annotations we have in our
reference standard. Therefore, we believe that partial
and fully-contained matches are more relevant in this
study and give us more useful information about the
suitability of these systems to de-identify VHA clinical
documents. Also, Table 4 only presents recall measure-
ments because of our emphasis on PHI detection and re-
moval rather than correct PHI type assignment, and
because the mappings between the predicted PHI and the
reference standard are often not one-to-one mappings
and prevented us from determining the PHI type source
of false positives, and consequently the individual PHI
type precision values.
Tables 5 and 6 show, in the same fashion as the previ-
ous two tables, the results of the 10-fold cross-validation
experiment carried out with the machine learning-based
de-identification tools (MIST and HIDE). Table 5 pre-
sents the overall precision, recall and F2-measure results
for the three kinds of matches with both one unique
PHI category and each individual PHI types. Table 6 pro-
vides recall values for each PHI type.Discussion
“Out-of-the-box” evaluation
Results of this first evaluation (Table 3) demonstrate
the difficulties rule-based systems have to determine
the exact boundaries of our PHI annotations. We
expected such low results since the regular expressions
and de-identification algorithms implemented in these
systems were designed with different PHI annotation
guidelines, different clinical documents, and in differ-
ent institutions. As mentioned earlier, they often add
word delimiters to the PHI annotations, or some text
portions that are not part of the reference annotations
(e.g., ‘JOB#’ in “JOB#000201” or ‘Dr.’ in “Dr. Sands”).
Machine learning-based systems obtain better exact
match results, suggesting that some resources, algo-
rithms, and features like the ‘BIO’ schema used by
these systems to determine PHI boundaries could be
suitable for de-identifying our VHA documents.As expected, Table 3 illustrates that the best results are
achieved with partial matches and one unique PHI cat-
egory (95% precision, 78% recall and 67% F2-measure),
decreasing dramatically when considering fully-contained
matches (58% precision, 36% recall, 37% F2-measure). It
indicates the need for adapting the de-identification
methods and resources to our PHI specifications and
documents. However, partial matches results are quite en-
couraging, suggesting that, after adaptation, we could
reach at least such performance.
In general, results with one unique PHI category (i.e.,
without considering mapping between PHI types) are
better than with each PHI type analyzed individually, es-
pecially for rule-based systems. To our understanding,
there are two reasons for this: 1) the differences between
some PHI types are quite small, and regular expressions
used to detect a specific PHI type also recognize other
PHI types (e.g., Phone Numbers and Other ID Numbers);
and 2) sometimes dictionary entries are common to
more than one PHI type, causing ambiguity issues (e.g.,
‘Aurora’ could be a city, person name, or the name of a
hospital). In contrast, for machine learning-based sys-
tems the differences with one unique PHI category and
all PHI types are less significant. We believe that this is
because the training features used by the systems are
mainly based on the context (i.e., surrounding words
and characters) and morphology of the words, and don’t
rely on fixed patterns or dictionary entries. This may
cause these systems to achieve lower recall but seems to
make them more precise.
In general, rule-based systems achieve better recall
values overall, but lower precision than machine
learning-based systems. However, it is worth mentioning
that the MIT deid system obtained a precision of 81%
with partial matches, which points out that its pattern
matching techniques and dictionaries will be useful to
accurately de-identify our documents. For the machine
learning-based systems, precision was always higher, but
recall usually lower. This is not surprising since the
training models were created using the i2b2 corpora,
which does not correspond enough to our clinical docu-
ments. Furthermore, the lack of learning features derived
from dictionaries has also an impact on recall issues.
For de-identification, recall (i.e., sensitivity) is the most
important measure to take into account. Personal identi-
fiable data cannot be revealed under any circumstance, it
is therefore more important to get high sensitivity when
obscuring PHI than higher precision. Table 4 shows the
recall values for each individual PHI type. As with over-
all results, rule-based systems achieved better recall, es-
pecially with some PHI types such as Zip codes,
Age> 89 and SSN. Techniques based on pattern match-
ing clearly seem to be the most appropriate for these
types of PHI.
Table 4 “Out-of-the-box” individual PHI recall results for partial and fully-contained matches using the VHA evaluation
corpus
RULE-BASED SYSTEMS
PHI type #Inst. PARTIAL MATCHES FULLY-CONTAINED MATCHES
HMS Scrubber MeDS MIT deid HMS Scrubber MeDS MIT deid
Patient Name 206 0.83 0.99 0.98 0.57 0.69 0.69
Relative Name 30 0.76 0.95 1 0.57 0.67 0.77
Healthcare Provider Name 492 0.74 0.96 0.94 0.43 0.47 0.38
Other Person Name 20 0.66 0.81 0.74 0.30 0.25 0.35
Street City 137 0.90 0.96 0.81 0.70 0.78 0.78
State Country 161 0.45 0.49 0.85 0.43 0.45 0.84
Deployment 43 0.34 0.49 0.27 0.07 0.02 0.05
ZIP code 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
Healthcare Unit Name 1453 0.45 0.51 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.03
Other Org Name 86 0.33 0.50 0.27 0.03 0.20 0.03
Date 2547 0.74 0.87 0.80 0.34 0.27 0.46
Age> 89 4 0 0 1 0 0 1
Phone Number 90 0.73 0.79 0.80 0.42 0.5 0.48
Electronic Address 4 0 0.86 0.75 0 0 0.75
SSN 16 1 1 1 1 1 1
Other ID Number 123 0.66 0.82 0.41 0.43 0.61 0.27
MACHINE LEARNING-BASED SYSTEMS
PHI type #Inst. PARTIAL MATCHES FULLY-CONTAINED MATCHES
MIST HIDE MIST HIDE
Patient Name 206 0.51 0.54 0.42 0.50
Relative Name 30 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Healthcare Provider Name 492 0.53 0.59 0.44 0.53
Other Person Name 20 0 0.20 0 0.15
Street City 137 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.27
State Country 161 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.21
Deployment 43 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02
ZIP code 4 0 0.75 0 0.75
Healthcare Unit Name 1453 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05
Other Org Name 86 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06
Date 2547 0.72 0.73 0.39 0.38
Age> 89 4 0 0 0 0
Phone Number 90 0.34 0.61 0.24 0.51
Electronic Address 4 0 0 0 0
SSN 16 0.56 0.87 0.56 0.87
Other ID Number 123 0.32 0.69 0.20 0.63
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109Names in general, and especially Patient Names, are also
well de-identified by rule-based systems, reaching the
highest (partial match) recall of 99% by MeDS. Location
information (Street City, State Country) and Electronic Ad-
dress are also properly covered by at least one rule-based
system. This fact suggests that dictionaries of names, cities
and countries, as well as the patterns used by these sys-
tems for names, cities, countries, postal addresses, e-mailsand webpages are useful for our purposes; and they will be
considered for future implementations.
These results also show that some of our PHI types
need new methods or strategies for de-identification. For
instance, the recall obtained for Deployment, Healthcare
Unit Name and Other Organization Name is somewhat
low and needs improvements. This is probably due to: 1)
Deployment annotations being almost exclusive to
Table 5 10 fold cross-validation overall results using the VHA evaluation corpus for exact, partial and fully-contained
matches with one PHI category, and with each PHI types separately
10-fold cross-validation experiment
Overall results EXACT MATCHES PARTIAL MATCHES FULLY-CONTAINED MATCHES
MIST HIDE MIST HIDE MIST HIDE
One PHI P (CI) 0.89 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.91
(0.88-0.90) (0.87-0.89) (0.95-0.97) (0.94-0.96) (0.90-0.92) (0.90-0.92)
R (CI) 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.67 0.73
(0.625-0.655) (0.685-0.715) (0.685-0.715) (0.75-0.77) (0.655-0.685) (0.72-0.74)
F2 (CI) 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.71 0.76
(0.665-0.695) (0.72-0.74) (0.725-0.755) (0.775-0.805) (0.70-0.72) (0.75-0.77)
All PHI types P (CI) 0.87 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.89
(0.855-0.885) (0.86-0.88) (0.94-0.96) (0.905-0.935) (0.885-0.915) (0.88-0.90)
R (CI) 0.63 0.69 0.69 0.74 0.66 0.71
(0.615-0.655) (0.675-0.705) (0.675-0.705) (0.725-0.755) (0.645-0.675) (0.695-0.725)
F2 (CI) 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.70 0.74
(0.655-0.685) (0.71-0.73) (0.713-0.745) (0.76-0.78) (0.685-0.715) (0.725-0.755)
CI: Confidence Interval obtained with a confidence level of 95%.
One PHI = one overall PHI category considered.
All PHI types = each PHI type evaluated separately.
P= Precision; R=Recall; F2= F2-measure.
Ferrández et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2012, 12:109 Page 12 of 16
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109characteristics of VHA documents, and not specified in
the HIPAA legislation; 2) Healthcare Unit Name identi-
fiers involving numerous acronyms and abbreviations
that were often missed (e.g., OT (Occupational Ther-
apy), ER (Emergency Room)); and 3) Other Organization
Name being a very ‘open’ category (even if some systems
included dictionaries of company names).Table 6 10 fold cross-validation recall results for partial and f
evaluation corpus
10-fold cross-validation experiment
PHI type #Inst. PARTIAL M
MIST
Patient Name 206 0.51
Relative Name 30 0
Healthcare Provider Name 492 0.58
Other Person Name 20 0
Street City 137 0.28
State Country 161 0.58
Deployment 43 0.19
ZIP code 4 0
Healthcare Unit Name 1453 0.55
Other Org Name 86 0.10
Date 2547 0.93
Age> 89 4 0
Phone Number 90 0.27
Electronic Address 4 0.75
SSN 16 0.37
Other ID Number 123 0.37Machine learning-based systems are more precise
when determining PHI boundaries, and interestingly
performed well with several PHI types like Dates, Phone
Numbers and Other ID Numbers that supposedly should
be properly detected by pattern matching techniques.
We will report reasons for that when analyzing systems



















Figure 4 Partial matches character overlap analysis.
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As previously mentioned, this experiment was the first
adaptation of machine learning-based de-identification
tools to VHA clinical documents. The main objective of
this experiment was to analyze the performance of two
machine learning-based text de-identification tools with
their default configuration and with training and testing
using our VHA documents.
Table 5 presents the overall results for this experiment,
which –as expected– significantly surpass the ones
obtained by these systems when trained with the i2b2
de-identification corpus. For the three types of matches,
precision was good, with values between 87% and 96%;
and recall was higher (63%-76%), allowing for a higher
79% F2-measure.
These results demonstrate again that machine
learning-based tools allow for better precision than rule-
based systems, although a need for recall improvement
is still present.When examining performance with each individual
PHI type (Table 6), recall was relatively low with several
PHI types such as Relative Name, Other Person Name,
Deployment, Zip code, Other Organization Name and
Age> 89. This low performance was due to the lack of
features tailored to specific PHI types, as well as to the
scarcity of training examples in a few PHI types (e.g.,
only 4 examples of Zip code and Age> 89 in our evalu-
ation corpus). However, when the number of training
examples increases, the impact of specific training fea-
tures lessens, as exemplified with Healthcare Unit
Names and Dates (more than 2,500 training examples in
our evaluation corpus).
Among machine learning-based systems, one was
clearly better when redacting numerical PHI identifiers
such as Phone Number and Other ID Number. We be-
lieve that this difference occurs because this system uses
several numerical learning features such as is-a-4digits-
token and is-a-CharsNumbers-token, which are not
Ferrández et al. BMC Medical Research Methodology 2012, 12:109 Page 14 of 16
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system, and allow for more discriminating training mod-
els for these PHI types. This demonstrates the import-
ance of learning features adapted to the target PHI type.
Partial matches analysis
To have a more precise insight of partial matches, we
analyzed the percentage of overlapping characters of all
partial matches. As shown in Figure 4, most systems had
partial matches with between 20% and 70% characters
overlap. Rule-based systems had partial matches that
mostly fell into the 20-40% character-overlapping rate,
which means that considerable adaptations of their algo-
rithms would be needed. In contrast, the MIT deid sys-
tem had partial detections overlapping between 50 and
70%, indicating that its algorithms work better with our
PHI formats. Finally, machine learning-based systems
trained using the i2b2 corpus made partial predictions
that mostly overlapped between 60 and 70%, while for
the 10-fold cross-validation experiment the predominant
category was 20-30% for HIDE and 50-60% for MIST.
Therefore, although the overall recall for MIST and
HIDE trained with the i2b2 corpus was quite low
(Table 3), the partial detections they produced were
somewhat accurate in terms of characters overlap. The
lower overlap rate reached with the 10-fold cross-
validation experiment demonstrates a need for more
training examples and advanced learning features that
make partial detections more accurate.
Systems errors analysis
Besides measuring the performance of the de-
identification systems, we also performed a detailed
errors analysis. The main observations of this analysis
are detailed below.
Main causes of missing PHI annotations (i.e., false
negatives):
 Unusual PHI formats: Some PHI types appear
within our documents in unusual formats that are
not always detected by the de-identification systems.
Rule-based systems missed these annotations
because none of their regular expressions capture
such formats; while for machine learning-based
systems, these annotations were missed because of
differences between the training and testing feature
vectors or because of a lack of useful training
features capturing these atypical PHI formats.
However, the de-identification systems sometimes
partially captured these unusual formats, as reflected
by an increase in partial matches. For example, the
instance of Dates ‘Jan 09, 2000@07:54:32’ was
partially detected by all three rule-based
de-identification systems, and missed by themachine learning-based systems when trained with
the i2b2 de-identification corpus. Other examples of
missing annotations were phone numbers that
included country codes, and day intervals such as
‘WFS’ or ‘M-F’.
 Acronyms and abbreviations: The Healthcare Unit
Names PHI type includes many acronyms and
abbreviations referring to healthcare facilities that
are frequently missed by all five de-identification
systems. For instance, ‘MH’ (Mental Health), ‘ECF’
(Extended Care Facility), or ‘ENT’ (Ear, Nose,
Throat) were always missed by all systems. A
possible reason for this is that these systems were
developed with a different definition of what a PHI
is. Concluding that a term is PHI or not is at times a
judgment call. Admittedly, in our evaluation we
defined terms that are PHI in a relatively broad
sense. It is conceivable that others may be of the
opinion that these terms do not meet the strict
definition of PHI.
 Lack of examples: This mainly affects machine
learning-based systems; and it causes PHI patterns
with few instances in the corpus to be missed. For
instance, less than 10 instances of Dates formats like
‘020309’ or ‘70’s’ were found in our corpus, and they
were often missed. This of course highlights one of
the key weaknesses of all machine learning based
systems: lack of training data.
Main causes of spurious PHI annotations (i.e., false
positives):
 Measurements: A common error committed by all
systems consisted in confusing medical
measurements with Dates or other numerical
identifiers. For instance, in the phrases “rating: 1/10”
and “maintain CVD 8-10”, ‘1/10’ and ‘8-10’ were
annotated as Dates.
 Ambiguous words: Common words, which could
also represent PHI, were often wrongly annotated by
the systems, especially by rule-based de-
identification systems. For instance, ‘BROWN,
‘GRAY’, ‘WALKER’ or ‘CUTTER’ are examples of
ambiguous words that were sometimes wrongly
recognized as PHI by the systems.
 De-identification systems’ specific PHI types: A few
PHI types annotated by de-identification systems
were not included in our PHI specification. For
example, HMS Scrubber annotates expressions like
‘30 days’ as ages; however, these annotations are not
considered PHI in our reference standard.
This errors analysis emphasizes the need for adapta-
tion of methods used by de-identification systems in
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documents. It is also clear that in general, system adap-
tation is required to achieve accurate de-identification of
corpora the system was not developed or trained on.
Therefore, it is important to evaluate system adaptation
in terms of the time, effort and complexity required. For
example, compared to the annotation effort required by
machine learning-based systems, do rule-based de-
identification systems require less adaption time and ef-
fort to achieve acceptable de-identification performance
on disparate corpora? This is an area we hope to study
in future research. Also, improvements in the analysis of
the local context, VHA-specific dictionaries, and lists of
trigger words could be beneficial to disambiguate acro-
nyms, abbreviations, as well as VHA-specific PHI types
like Deployment. Finally, the large number of false posi-
tives introduced by rule-based methods indicates the
need for more sophisticated techniques to filter them
out and make these methods more accurate. The ques-
tion that remains however is can accurate filtering of
false positives be achieved while still maintaining high
recall (sensitivity).
Limitations
Although our VHA corpora include many different types
of clinical notes, the statements presented here are based
on our observations running the selected de-
identification systems on VHA clinical documents, and
don’t necessarily generalize to other organizations and
clinical document types.
Another limitation of this study is the size of the train-
ing corpus used in the 10-fold cross-validation experi-
ment. This limited size could have repercussions on the
training phase of machine learning-based systems. How-
ever, we believe that although small in size, our evalu-
ation corpus provides useful insights about the overall
performance that can be achieved by these systems. And
as previously mentioned, it shows that precision is well
addressed by machine learning-based systems, and we
will use this knowledge for future improvements and
developments of de-identification tools.
Conclusions
We have presented a study about the suitability of
current text de-identification methods and tools for de-
identifying VHA clinical documents. In this study, five
de-identification tools were selected and evaluated with
a corpus of VHA clinical documents. The “out-of-the-
box” evaluation performed in this study helped us deter-
mine how the default configuration of these tools
addressed the de-identification of our documents, and
more importantly, informed us about the best methods
and resources for our “best-of-breed” VHA text de-
identification tool. This “out-of-the-box” evaluationshowed us that some PHI types such as SSN and Zip
code are clearly recognized better by rule-based meth-
ods. Also, when considering partial matches, Names and
other ‘textual’ PHI are well de-identified by the algorith-
mic procedures developed by some rule-based systems
(MeDS and the MIT deid system). The results achieved
with the 10-fold cross-validation experiment show that
machine learning-based systems obtained better preci-
sion; methods based on machine learning algorithms
could therefore play an important role to improve the
overall precision of de-identification systems.
These observations convinced us that adapting the
techniques used by the rule-based systems to our docu-
ments, and using enriched feature sets and training
examples for machine learning-based approaches, could
lead to satisfactory de-identification of VHA clinical
documents. Rule-based inferences would be used to ob-
tain a high sensitivity, and machine learning approaches
would be applied to filter out the false positives pro-
duced by rule-based methods. Therefore, although this
study showed that none of the tested systems reported
sufficient “out-of-the-box” performance to de-identify
our VHA clinical documents, it gave us compelling
insight into the best methods to use when developing
our VHA de-identification tool.. This tool will take ad-
vantage of the methods used by the five systems tested
here, and also implement new techniques when needed.
To achieve this, we will adapt the rule-based techniques
to the format of our PHI identifiers as well as improve
the machine learning models.
Finally, we conclude with two issues that will lead fu-
ture discussions and reinforce the need for developing
accurate automated de-identification systems: 1) the risk
of re-identification; and 2) the interpretability of de-
identified documents.
Obviously, the better the de-identification, the lower
the risk of re-identification. However, beyond de-
identification techniques, there is always a potential risk
of re-identification. De-identification is not anonymiza-
tion. Several studies [21] have demonstrated that a com-
bination of specific pieces of information or events (even
if they are not considered PHI by the HIPAA “Safe Har-
bor” method) could provide enough evidence to identify
an individual. This fact proves the strong need for accur-
ate de-identification tools, and probably more conserva-
tive approaches than the HIPAA “Safe Harbor”
technique (e.g., in our VHA corpus we followed the
HIPAA guidelines, but also annotated all states, coun-
tries, all elements of dates including years, and deploy-
ment information, which could uniquely identify a
veteran), possibly adapting some anonymization algo-
rithms to narrative text.
On the other hand, depending on the target research
study, de-identified narratives may not be useful (e.g.,
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/12/109statistics about specific zip codes). Furthermore, if the
de-identification tool is extremely oriented toward pa-
tient confidentiality protection (e.g., by removing all por-
tions of text that are not considered medical concepts,
as experimented by Berman [22]), the interpretability
and usefulness of the documents can be severely com-
promised, making any subsequent analysis like informa-
tion extraction extremely arduous.
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